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TAX POLICY RESPONSE TO MARKET CHANGES:
THE CASE OF THE GAMING SERVICES SECTOR
1. IntroductIon
In recent years the gaming services sector has undergone a 
relevant expansion in several OECD countries. In the EU, for 
instance, annual revenues of the market have almost reached € 85 
billion in 2011. Distinguishing features of this evolution have been 
the changes in the technological and legal environments, such as the 
growth of on-line gambling and the liberalisation of the sector. This 
development has been accompanied also by a change in taxation 
policy.
Against this background, this paper has a two-fold motivation: 
first, on applied grounds, to examine the economic rationale behind 
actual and prospected reforms, analysing the effects of gambling 
taxes on profits; second, on methodological grounds, to extend 
existing industrial organisation results on the effects of cost changes 
in oligopolistic industries to different types of taxation instruments.
The theme unifying our analysis is the question whether 
taxation of gaming services, rather than impairing net revenues, has 
possibly contributed to increasing profits in the sector. The problem 
is, under a theoretical point of view, an old one, and its solution is 
strictly connected to the structure of the market that one is facing. 
Intuition suggests that taxation, representing an increase in costs, 
brings about a decrease in profits. However, there are instances in 
which empirical evidence seems to go against this suggestion. The 
most famous observation in this sense is the development of the oil 
industry in the early Seventies: the profits of the major multinational 
companies increased after the rise in the cost of crude oil.
The conventional explanation of this finding rests upon the 
oligopolistic structure of the market: adverse circumstances induced 
a collusive behaviour on part of the oligopolists, with the consequent 
increase in profits. In fact, oligopoly, though being the reason for 
the result, might have provided a different mechanism producing it, 
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a mechanism that is peculiar to this market structure and is absent 
both in perfect competition and monopoly regimes.
This mechanism is the following. Producers in an oligopolistic 
market face a sort of public good problem: restraining output by 
one firm would raise the price(s) all firms face, thus producing a 
common benefit. However, the cost of the restraint (loss of profits) 
would remain a private cost of the firm undertaking it. Taxation, 
by inducing a cost increase, brings about the output restriction and 
mimics the collusion that firms are unable to achieve by themselves.
This distinguishing feature of oligopoly has been first put forward 
by Salop (1981), de Meza (1982), Katz and Rosen (1983) and Seade (1985). 
In particular, Seade (1985) demonstrates the counterintuitive outcome 
of a profit increase as a result of the introduction of a specific tax.
In the next two sections, we extend Seade’s analysis to a 
variety of taxes, in order to verify the applicability of his findings 
to the gambling sector and to explain, on the basis of the results 
being obtained, the tendency to a shift from specific to ad valorem 
taxation that is taking place under the pressure of the changes in the 
industry environment (reduction in trade barriers, growth of internet 
gambling, increase in the number of available substitutes).
Then, section 3 applies the results to the evolution of taxation 
policy as a response to the structural changes undergone by the 
gambling sector, in particular the shift from specific to ad valorem 
taxation. We conclude by proposing avenues for further research. 
The paper ends with a technical appendix.
2.  dIfferent tax structures In the gamblIng sector and theIr 
Impact on profIts
Government regulation1, together with structural features of the 
gambling sector, such as the presence of economies of scale and the 
need for a large capital base because of the high risk involved, has led 
1 Traditionally, the disquiet towards the social costs of gambling activity, 
in particular the effects on excessive gamblers and the ease of criminal 
involvement, has explained the regulatory role of the state in the sector as 
a social guardian and a consumers’ protector. While proving more effective 
than prohibition in reducing illegal gambling, legalisation and regulation have 
produced a base for taxation, introducing a fiscal stake of governments in the 
gambling industry (this ambiguity was pointed out at least since De Viti de 
Marco, 1936; see also Smith, 2000).
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to concentrated structures, with a few firms dominating the market. 
In this context taxation, together with the imposition of licensing 
fees, can capture firms’ profits. Regulation might therefore be a way 
of limiting entry into the industry not to see this stream of revenues 
being competed away together with economic rents.
Under a public finance perspective, should gambling taxation hit 
economic rents generated by government action, it would be both 
an efficient and equitable way of raising revenues. If, instead, it 
turned out to be a tax on consumption, it could be distortionary 
and regressive: taxation could in fact increase producers’ (net) prices, 
therefore falling onto consumers. Moreover, under oligopoly, even 
firms’ profits might increase because of taxation, a result that may be 
applied to interpret the developments undergone in this oligopolistic 
industry.
Before doing this, some peculiarities of market variables for the 
gaming services sector must be taken into account. 
In fact, in the gambling market, the definitions of output and price 
are not so obvious as for other goods and services. Conventionally, 
quantity is given by a money measure, that is the amount staked, 
also termed “number of unit bets”, while the price is the take-out 
rate, that is the percentage of the stake retained by the operator after 
paying out winnings. As a consequence, total revenue is the total 
amount the operator retains after having paid out winnings.
Thus, (net) profits Π will be given by:
Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.     csw −−=Π )1( , 
    (1) 
where s indicates the total amount of money staked with the firm, w the winnings to stake 
ratio, (1-w)s  total revenues and c total costs; (1-w)  is the operator’s take-out rate, also called “win 
percent”, that is the price of a one unit bet; in what follows, we will indicate it by r. 
These definitions of quantity, price and revenues have implications as for the definitions of 
taxes once they are applied to the gaming sector. In particular, a tax on stakes, that is a tax on 
revenues gross of winnings payout, is equivalent to a specific tax: 
ctrs −−=Π )( , 
where t is the specific tax rate, while a tax on revenues net of winnings payout is equivalent to 
an ad valorem tax: 
csr −−=Π )1( θ , 
where θ is the ad valorem tax rate.  
In order to analyse tax shifting, we adopt a conjectural variations model of oligopolistic 
equilibrium under conditions of industry-wide symmetry as in Seade (1980, 1985). The industry 
consists of n firms; each firm faces an inverse demand function for the aggregate amount of 
money staked  r(ns)  and is characterised by a cost function  c(s, τ), where τ is a shift parameter 
connected to taxation. Considering taxes as a shift factor on the costs side is done by Seade for the 
case of a specific tax; we extend this framework to different kind of taxes to explain their different 
impact2. 
Profits are maximised over the total amount of money staked with firm: 
2 Compare with the analysis of specific and ad valorem taxation in Delipalla and Keen (1992). 
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In order to analyse tax shifting, we adopt a conjectural variations 
model of oligopolistic equilibrium under conditions of industry-wide 
symmetry as in Seade (1980, 1985). The industry consists of n firms; 
each firm faces an inverse demand function for the aggregate amount 
of money staked r(ns) and is characterised by a cost function c(s, τ), 
where τ is a shift parameter connected to taxation. Considering taxes 
as a shift factor on the costs side is done by Seade for the case of a 
specific tax; we extend this framework to different kind of taxes to 
explain their different impact2.
Profits are maximised over the total amount of money staked 
with the firm:
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where b(s) are before tax costs; marginal costs increase by the same 
amount of the tax.
We are interested in the effects on output, price and profits.
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the expression is negative given (5). Thus, output falls as marginal costs increase because of 
the tax, which implies that shifting takes place. One finds the amount of the tax being shifted onto 
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The term on the left hand side is the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand, that on the 
right hand side is one minus the effect on the firm’s marginal cost of the perceived change in r 
due to the change in firm’s output (which, for instance, will be equal to unity under linear costs, 
with css = 0). Therefore, overshifting will occur, for instance, under linear costs with any isoelastic 
demand function4. 
Overshifting means that the producer’s (net of tax) price rises. Under perfect competition and 
monopoly, profits nevertheless decrease because of the fall in output, as intuition would predict as 
a result of the introduction of a tax. Under oligopoly, however, profits might increase with the 
tax, as outlined above: taxation, by increasing marginal costs, induces the restraint that collusion 
3 This will be true unless collusion is very high. 
4 The elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand is related to the elasticity of ordinary demand ε, namely: 
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increasing marginal costs, induces the restraint that collusion would 
have achieved.
Thus, on the one hand, there is the direct, negative effect on 
profits due to the rise in costs because of the tax, cτ, while, on the 
other hand, there is the positive effect deriving from the rise in price 
due to the fall in output driven by the increase in marginal costs, csτ. 
When will the latter effect outweigh the former?
By differentiating (2), one gets:
would have achieved. Thus, on the one hand, there is the direct, negative effect on profits due to 
the rise in costs because of the tax, cτ, while, on the other hand, there is the positive effect 
deriving from the rise in price due to the fall in output driven by the increase in marginal costs, 
csτ. When will the latter effect outweigh the former? 
By differentiating (2), one gets: 
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For λ≥n  and given (5), the sign of the effect of τ on Π depends on the signs of  csτ  and  cτ; 
for a specific tax, cτ = s  and  csτ = 1, that is: 
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which is positive if the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand is greater than 2 minus the 
effect on the firm’s own marginal costs of the perceived change in r deriving from the change in 
own output. For the case of linear costs and isoelastic demand, for instance, profits will increase if  
ε < 1. As argued in Seade (1985) and Katz and Rosen (1983), profits and price overshifting is not 
a curiosity, but a result that is about as likely to take place as not. 
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which is positive if the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand 
is greater than 2 minus the effect on the firm’s own marginal costs 
of the perceived change in r deriving from the change in own output. 
For the case of linear costs and isoelastic demand, for instance, 
profits will increase if ε < 1.
As argued in Seade (1985) and Katz and Rosen (1983), profits 
and price overshifting is not a curiosity, but a result that is about as 
likely to take place as not.
3.2 The Case of an ad valorem Tax
Let us now turn to an ad valorem tax. This will determine a 
shift in costs such that:
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Under this respect, the effect of the tax resembles that of an increase also in fixed costs. This 
element is crucial in making a profit increase less likely with an ad valorem tax than with a specific 
tax. Starting with the effect on output, (8) becomes: 
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since the numerator is positive by (3), while the denominator is negative by (5). Again, output 
falls as marginal costs increase with the tax, thus implying shifting. 
As for the effect on prices, (9) becomes: 
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where the numerator is negative for  n > λ,  while the denominator is positive if equilibrium is 
stable. 
The beneficial effect of the restraint is lower than before relatively to the direct negative effect 
on profits (the effect on average costs is relatively larger than that on marginal costs) – and it will 
be the lower, the lower λ with respect to n. 
 
3.3 The Case of a Lump Sum Tax 
The positive direct effect on profits of course disappears in the case of a lump sum tax: 
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5 Compare with equations 2.10 and 2.11 in Delipalla and Keen (1992). 
 9 
                                                        
, t  i  if Overshifting will occur if 
τ
τ
sc
d
dr
>1, that is if ,1
'''(
)('
>
−+ sscsrnn
nns
λ which is th  case if 
,0''' >−+ sscrnrn
λλ as for a specific tax. This is because the difference with the previous case 
stems from the different change in average costs and therefore in profits5. In fact, (13) becomes: 
[ ] ,'/''')(
)1('
]
''')(
')()[(
2
rcsrnrn
n
rS
s
csrnrn
srnnsr
d
d
ssss −++
−
+−
−++
−
=
Π
λλ
λ
λλ
λ
τ
  (13’) 
where the numerator is negative for  n > λ,  while the denominator is positive if equilibrium is 
stable. 
The beneficial effect of the restraint is lower than before relatively to the direct negative effect 
on profits (the effect on average costs is relatively larger than that on marginal costs) – and it will 
be the lower, the lower λ with respect to n. 
 
3.3 The Case of a Lump Sum Tax 
The positive direct effect on profits of course disappears in the case of a lump sum tax: 
ττ += )(),( sbsc  
ss bc =  
1=τc  
.0=τsc  
We thus obtain: 
5 Compare with equations 2.10 and 2.11 in Delipalla and Keen (1992). 
 9 
                                                        
which is the case if 
Overshifting will occur if 
τ
τ
c
d
dr
>1, that is if ,1
''')(
)('
>
−++ sscsrnrn
nnsr
λλ which is the case if 
,0''' >−+ sscrnrn
λλ as for a specific tax. This is because the difference with the previous case 
stems from the different change in average costs and therefore in profits5. In fact, (13) becomes: 
[ ] ,'/''')(
)1('
]
''')(
')()[(
2
rcsrnrn
n
rS
s
csrnrn
srnnsr
d
d
ssss −++
−
+−
−++
−
=
Π
λλ
λ
λλ
λ
τ
  (13’) 
where the numerator is negative for  n > λ,  while the denominator is positive if equilibrium is 
stable. 
The beneficial effect of the restraint is lower than before relatively to the direct negative effect 
on profits (the effect on average costs is relatively larger than that on marginal costs) – and it will 
be the lower, the lower λ with respect to n. 
 
3.3 The Case of a Lump Sum Tax 
The positive direct effect on profits of course disappears in the case of a lump sum tax: 
ττ += )(),( sbsc  
ss bc =  
1=τc  
.0=τsc  
We thus obt in: 
5 Compare with equations 2.10 and 2.11 in Delipalla and Keen (1992). 
 9 
                                                        
 as for a specific tax. This 
is because the difference with the previous case stems from the 
different change in average costs an  therefore in profits5. In fact, 
(13) becomes:
Overshifting will occur if 
τ
τ
sc
d
dr
>1, that is if ,1
''')(
)('
>
−++ sscsrrn
nns
λλ which is the case if 
,0''' >−+ sscrnrn
λλ as for a specific tax. This is because the difference with the previous case 
stems from the different change in average costs a the fore in profits5. In f ct, (13) becomes: 
[ ] ,'/''')(
)1('
]
''')(
')()[(
2
rcsrnrn
n
rS
s
csrnrn
srnnsr
d
d
ssss −++
−
+−
−++
−
=
Π
λλ
λ
λλ
λ
τ
  (13’) 
where the numerator is negative for  n > ,  while the denominator is positive if equilibrium is 
stable. 
The beneficial effect of the restraint is lower than before relatively to the direct negative effect 
on profits (the effect on average costs is relatively larger than tha  o  m rgi al costs) – and it will 
be the lower, the lower λ with respec  to n. 
 
3.3 The Case of a Lump Sum Tax 
The positive direct effect on profits of course disappears in the case of a lump sum tax: 
ττ += )(),( sbsc  
ss bc =  
1=τc  
.0=τsc  
We thus obtain: 
5 Compare with equations 2.10 and 2.11 in Delipalla and Keen (1992). 
 9 
                                                        
 (13’)
where the numerator is negative for n > λ, while the denominator 
is positive if equilibrium is stable.
The beneficial effect of the restraint is lower than before relatively 
to the direct negative effect on profits (the effect on average costs is 
5 Compare with equations 2.10 and 2.11 in Delipalla and Keen (1992).
3.2 The Case of an ad valorem Tax 
Let us now turn to an ad valorem tax. This wi l determine a shift in costs such that: 
snsrsbsc )()(),( ττ +=  
snsrnsrbc ss )(')( ττ ++=  
snsrc )(=τ  
.)(')( snsrnsrcs +=τ  
One should note that, di ferently from the case of a specific tax, the average cost increases by 
more than the marginal cost does: 
)()(),( nsr
s
sb
s
sc
τ
τ
+=  
).(
),((
nsr
d
s
scd
=
τ
τ
 
Und r this respect, the e fect of the ax resembles that of an increase also in fixed costs. This 
element is crucial in making a profit increase le s likely with an ad valorem tax than with a specific 
tax. Starting with the e fect on output, (8) becomes: 
,0
''')(
)(')(
<
−++
+
=
sscrnrn
nsnsrnsr
d
ds
λλτ    (8’) 
since the numerator is positive by (3), while the denominator is negative by (5). Again, output 
fa ls as marginal co ts increase with the tax, thus implying shifting. 
As for the e fect on prices, (9) becomes: 
 
.0
''')(
])(')([)('
>
−++
+
=
sscsrnrn
nsnsrnsrnnsr
d
dr
λλτ    (9’) 
 8 
180 V. De Bonis - A. Gandolfo
relatively larger than that on marginal costs) – and it will be the 
lower, the lower λ with respect to n.
3.3 The Case of a Lump Sum Tax
The positive direct effect on profits of course disappears in the 
case of a lump sum tax:
Overshifting will occur if 
τ
τ
sc
d
dr
>1, that is if ,1
''')(
)('
>
−++ sscsrnrn
nnsr
λλ which is the case if 
,0''' >−+ sscrnrn
λλ as for a specific tax. This is because the difference with the previous case 
stems from the different change in average costs and therefore in profits5. In fact, (13) becomes: 
[ ] ,'/''')(
)1('
]
''')(
')()[(
2
rcsrnrn
n
rS
s
csrnrn
srnnsr
d
d
ssss −++
−
+−
−++
−
=
Π
λλ
λ
λλ
λ
τ
  (13’) 
where the numerator is negative for  n > λ,  while the denominator is positive if equilibrium is 
stable. 
The beneficial effect of the restraint is lower than before relatively to the direct negative effect 
on profits (the effect on average costs is relatively larger than that on marginal costs) – and it will 
be the lower, the lower λ with respect to n. 
 
.  e ase of a Lump Sum Tax 
The positive direct effect on profits of course disappears in the case of a lump sum tax: 
ττ += )(),( sbsc  
ss bc =  
1=τc  
.0=τsc  
We thus obtain: 
5 Compare with equations 2.10 and 2.11 in Delipalla and Keen (1992). 
 9 
                                                        
Overshifting will occur if 
τ
τ
sc
dr
>1, that is if ,1
''')(
)('
>
−++ sscsrnrn
nnsr
λλ which is the case if 
,0''' >−+ sscrnrn
λλ as for a specific tax. This is because the difference with the previous case 
stems from the different change in average costs and therefore in profits5. In fact, (13) becomes: 
[ ] ,'/''')(
)1('
]
''')(
')()[(
2
rcsrnrn
n
rS
s
csrnrn
srnnsr
d
d
ssss −++
−
+−
−++
−
=
Π
λλ
λ
λλ
λ
τ
  (13’) 
where the numerator is negative for  n > λ,  while the denominator is positive if equilibrium is 
stable. 
The beneficial effect of the restraint is lower than before relatively to the direct negative effect 
on profits (the effect on average costs is relatively larger than that on marginal costs) – and it will 
be the lower, the lower λ with respect to n. 
 
3.3 The Case of a Lump Sum Tax 
The positive direct effect on profits of course disappears in the case of a lump sum tax: 
ττ += )(),( sbsc  
ss bc =  
1=τc  
.0=τsc  
We thus obtain: 
5 Compare with equations 2.10 and 2.11 in Delipalla and Keen (1992). 
 9 
                                                        
Overshifting will occur if 
τ
τ
sc
dr
>1, that is if ,1
''')(
)('
>
−++ sscsrnrn
nnsr
λλ which is the case if 
,0''' >−+ sscrnrn
λλ as for a specific tax. This is because the difference with the previous case 
stems from the different change in average costs and therefore in profits5. In fact, (13) becomes: 
[ ] ,'/''')(
)1('
]
''')(
')()[(
2
rcsrnrn
n
rS
s
csrnrn
srnnsrd
ssss −++
−
+−
−++
−
=
Π
λλ
λ
λλ
λ
τ
  (13’) 
where the numerator is negative for  n > λ,  while the denominator is positive if equilibrium is 
stable. 
The beneficial effect of the restraint is lower than before relatively to the direct negative effect 
on profits (the effect on average costs is relatively larger than that on marginal costs) – and it will 
be the lower, the lower λ with respect to n. 
 
3.3 The Case of a Lump Sum Tax 
The positive direct effect on profits of course disappears in the case of a lump sum tax: 
ττ += )(),( sbsc  
ss b=  
1τ  
.0=τs  
We thus obtain: 
5 Compare with equations 2.10 and 2.11 in Delipalla and Keen (1992). 
 9 
                                                        
Overshifting will occur if 
τ
τ
sc
dr
>1, that is if ,1
''')(
)('
>
−++ sscsrnrn
nnsr
λλ which is the case if 
,0''' >−+ sscrnrn
λλ as for a specific tax. This is because the difference with the previous case
stems from the different change in average costs and therefore in profits5. In fact, (13) becomes: 
[ ] ,'/''')(
)1('
]
''')(
')()[(
2
rcsrnrn
n
rS
s
csrnrn
srnnsrd
ssss −++
−
+−
−++
−
=
Π
λλ
λ
λλ
λ
τ
  (13’) 
where the numerator is negative for  n > λ,  while the denominator is positive if equilibrium is 
stable. 
The beneficial effect of the restraint is lower than before relatively to the direct negative effect 
on profits (the effect on average costs is relatively larger than that on marginal costs) – and it will 
be the lower, the lower λ with respect to n. 
 
3.3 The Case of a Lump Sum Tax 
The positive direct effect on profits of course disappears in the case of a lump sum tax: 
ττ += )(),( sbsc  
ss b=  
1τ  
.0=τs  
We thus obtain: 
5 Compare with equations 2.10 and 2.11 in Delipalla and Keen (1992). 
 9 
                                                        
We thus obtain:
,0
''')(
=
−++
=
ss
s
crnrn
c
d
ds
λλτ
τ     (8’’) 
thus implying no effect of the tax on the output level; 
,0)(' ==
ττ d
dsnnsr
d
dr
      (9’’) 
thus implying no effect on the price; 
.110]
''')(
')([ −=−=−
−++
−
=
Π
τ
τ
λλ
λ
τ
c
csrnrn
csrn
d
d
ss
s   (13’’) 
A lump sum tax, not affecting marginal costs, only has a negative direct effect on profits. Note 
that combining a specific tax with a lump sum tax resembles the results obtained with an ad 
valorem tax, by reducing the relative impact of the output restraint with respect to the direct one 
on profits. 
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price decreases as output increases as a result of this tax structure6. As for the effect on 
profits: 
( )[ ] ,0
'
''')(
'
>−
−++
−
=
Π r
r
sscsrnrn
Srn
d
d
λλ
λ
τ
 for n>λ:  (13’’’) 
the indirect effect from the increase in output is now negative as the direct one. Recalling that 
r = (1-w), that is, one minus the ratio between probability and stakes, a tax that is inversely 
related to the winning probability would be borne by operators, with a concomitant increase in 
the total amount of money being staked. 
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regulatory regimes that, though motivated by the aim of protecting 
the public, de facto have protected national industries. Limited 
competition results not only from regulation, but also from other 
market characteristics, in particular the presence of economies of scale 
(this is especially true for casinos, gaming machine manufacturing 
and lotteries). The market regime is thus that of an oligopoly. 
The analysis of the previous section shows that, in this set 
up, protection can derive also from taxation policy, given some 
conditions concerning the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand, 
which is linked to ordinary demand elasticity. Generally speaking, 
in oligopoly equilibrium is compatible with an inelastic demand. 
Quantitative analyses of the elasticity of demand for gambling are 
relatively few, mostly in the context of a monopoly franchise. The 
main findings are that: a) demand is elastic but not very elastic; 
and b) elasticity falls when the monopolistic regime turns to one 
of imperfect competition (see Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, 
2006, for a review).
It is thus plausible to find situations compatible with overshifting 
and profit increase. Actually, gaming taxes have for a long time 
been prevalently specific taxes (see, just to take one example, the 
general betting duty in the UK, levied as a proportion of stakes 
until the turn of the century). Under conditions of low elasticity, this 
guaranteed revenues for the government while maintaining firms’ 
profitability, though at the consumers’ expenses in terms of taxation 
burden (the tax generated increase in profits could anyway be hit by 
the corporate tax).
However, competitive pressures have increased within the gaming 
sector beginning with the 1990’s. Several factors have been at work. 
First, being part of the entertainment sector, gaming services are 
subject to a product life cycle: innovation and marketing are needed 
not to lose customers, legal restrictions constituting a menace for the 
growth of the sector. Second, technological changes, in particular the 
growth of e-commerce, and the fall of trade barriers have increased 
both the number of available substitutes and that of operators, 
opening national markets to foreign competition. As for the EU, in 
relation to sports betting there has been a growing number of cases 
in the Court of Justice on the interpretation of Articles 56 and 49 
TFEU, that state the freedom to provide and receive services and 
the freedom of establishment, respectively.
The Court has held that national restrictions justified by general 
interest objectives, such as the protection of consumers, must be 
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consistent and systematic: in particular, a member state cannot restrict 
the access to gambling services if, at the same time, it encourages 
the participation to games offered by national operators (see Court of 
Justice of the European Union Case C-260/04; C-42/07; joined Cases 
C-316/07, C-358/07, C-359/07, C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07; 
C-46/08; C-64/08; C-347/09; joined Cases C-72/10 and C-77/10)7.
National industries have thus been put under threat and, together 
with them, governments’ tax revenues.
The difficulty of maintaining an effective protection of national 
markets has stimulated a wave of liberalisation concerning both the 
type of legally available products and the design of taxation. A key 
feature of the latter has been the shift from specific to ad valorem 
taxation (see, for instance, the replacement of the general betting 
duty in the UK, as reported in Paton et al., 2002), or the more 
recent introduction of a tax on stake net of winnings in the case 
of cash games and casino games in Italy; also, a combination of a 
licensing fee and a specific tax, that, as previously shown, mimics 
the effect of an ad valorem tax, has in some cases replaced specific 
taxation, as reported in Swiss Institute of Comparative Law (2006).
This shift represents an adaptation of taxation policy to the 
changing industry environment.
Actually, in the new situation, the increase in the competitive 
pressure has undermined the possibility of taxing gaming services 
without impairing firms’ profitability. Given this, value added 
taxation is preferable to specific taxation because, on the one hand, 
it induces a lower welfare loss and, on the other hand, it provides an 
incentive for firm to pursue technical efficiency. In fact, a specific 
tax typically results in a lower output level and a lower consumer 
7 In particular, in the joined Cases C-72/10 and C-77/10, the Court 
held that, on the basis of the principles of equal treatment and of non 
discrimination on grounds of nationality and the consequent obligation of 
transparency, a member state that has unlawfully excluded a category of 
operators from a tendering procedure for licenses and that tries to remedy 
the breach of the EU law by putting out to tender new licenses is precluded 
from protecting the market positions of existing operators by requiring a 
minimum distance between the establishments of the new licensees and those 
of the old ones. Moreover, the Court held that these excluded operators could 
not be punished for engaging in the activity without a license, and that it 
followed from Articles 56 and 49 TFEU, the principle of equal treatment and 
the obligation of transparency, that the conditions and rules of a tendering 
procedure should be drawn up in a clear, precise and unequivocal way.
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surplus than those obtainable under and ad valorem tax yielding the 
same amount of revenues.
This is connected to the fact that, under ad valorem taxation, 
firms enjoying some degree of price-setting power follow a low 
margin-high turnover strategy, while a specific tax induces a high 
margin-low turnover one. Moreover, incentives to pursue technical 
efficiency and to innovate to reduce costs are higher if taxation is 
proportional to the price charged. In the present context of the 
gambling sector, ad valorem taxation displays a further advantage 
for firms: as competition from abroad tends to reduce margins, 
the burden of taxation automatically decreases, thus providing a 
stabilisation mechanism in the face of changing market conditions. 
5. conclusIon: a take-out ratIo tax?
In the context of the gaming sector, the role of the price charged 
by producers is played by the take-out ratio. The analysis in section 
3 shows that a tax on it, besides providing the same incentives for 
technical efficiency and displaying the same flexibility as in the case 
of an ad valorem tax, also would encourage an increase in output. 
This, under a market regime of imperfect competition, would be 
linked to an increase in consumer surplus and to an overall efficiency 
gain even with respect to a situation without taxes. This reasoning is 
of course linked to the assumption that governments do use taxation 
in order to raise revenues and not in order to decrease the amount 
of gambling in consideration of its social costs. Further research is 
needed to verify the existence of ways of implementing this form of 
tax structure. 
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RIASSUNTO
L’adeguamento della politica fiscale ai cambiamenti di mercato:
il caso del settore del gioco pubblico
I cambiamenti che hanno interessato il settore del gioco 
pubblico in Italia nell’entità e nella struttura della spesa dei giocatori 
hanno indotto i governi a ripensare profondamente la modalità 
di imposizione. Questo articolo prende in esame le motivazioni 
economiche alla base degli interventi riformatori, estendendo alcuni 
risultati tipici dell’organizzazione industriale relativi agli effetti dei 
cambiamenti nei costi di produzione di industrie oligopolistiche alle 
diverse regole di tassazione.
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